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I. INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to be part of this panel devoted to the Middle East and of this
year's rich program at International Law Weekend.
I have decided not to speak directly about Arab human rights today, despite
the title of my panel. I believe you will agree with this decision, given that most
of what I have to say about the recent context of human rights in Arab countries
is pessimistic. The post September 11, 2001 context has allowed political
systems in the Middle East to use deterring terrorism as an excuse to clamp
down on human rights to a worrying extent. I shall talk a little about human
rights in Arab countries, but mostly as an example of a broader argument I
would like to present to you about law and politics in the Middle East.
I would like to discuss instead a general issue that has been of interest to
me since fieldwork I did as a Fulbright Scholar in Morocco in the early 1990s.
At that time, I was visiting the uncle of a Moroccan professor friend of mine in
a quintessentially rural village in a really remote region of the country. This is
the sort of place that took hours to get to by bus from the nearest large town, and
had the electricity and running water cut off for hours every day. There I was
having tea with a man in an unheated living room with no electricity and far
away in space and time from think tanks in Cairo or Washington. Then we
started to talk about politics. My host astonished me by stating bluntly that "the
real problem in our local and national politics is instilling popular respect for the
rule of law." As the lights occasionally flickered on and our tea was refreshed,
* Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Center for Public Policy and
Administration, University of Massachusetts-Amherst; A.B., Princeton University, A.M., J.D., Ph.D.
(expected), Harvard University. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the
International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
from October 20 to 22, 2004.
344 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:343
we proceeded to speak for an hour or so about the rule of law and politics in
Morocco.
I decided that I wished to follow up on this conversation. More specifi-
cally, my sense that even in isolated parts of Arab countries people appreciated
the idea of the rule of law in sophisticated ways led me to conduct research on
how this is used more generally in contemporary political discourse by diverse
politically-active Arabs. Since my initial interest in this general area, even
before the Bush Administration's self-created challenge of trying to shape a
viable political and legal order in Iraq, the importance of the rule of law in Arab
societies has gained enormous ground as a focus in Washington. Out of a sense
that neither Arab democratic political institutions nor integration into the global
economy can occur without the rule of law, well-meaning American policy-
makers and legal practitioners have built a new industry to teach Middle
Easterners their collected wisdom as to how law works. As Tom Carothers at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has observed, however,
American rule of law specialists often operate with a striking lack of clear
knowledge about what and how they are doing.'
This problem is especially evident with respect to contemporary Arab
societies. Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa generally share two
features: non-democratic governments; and legal systems that are a patchwork
of Islamic, Ottoman, European, and contemporary sources. It certainly does not
make sense to presume that thinkers and practitioners trained in an Anglo-
American common law tradition can build respect for the rule of law by
transporting and transplanting their technocratic techniques to such different
legal soil. Indeed, the very idea that people in Arab societies would be receptive
to being taught by Americans how to reform their legal systems in the current
climate of popular mistrust of the United States reflects some combination of
elitism, hubris, and ignorance.
Thus, there is little reason to believe that American lawyers can bring the
rule of law directly to Arabs. Nonetheless, there are grounds to appreciate the
importance of shoring up law's potential to check the political centralization and
corruption of contemporary Arab political systems. This talk embraces the
assumption that enhancements in the rule of law may be useful to Arab citizens,
who generally have concerns about the accountability and performance of their
governments. However, I also argue that it is crucial to map out the terrain and
contours of law in the current political context of these societies, rather than
simply taking on faith that they are conducive to improvement by American
legal practice. Indeed, selective enhancement of the rule of law in Arab
1. Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 5 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003).
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societies may actually have the effect of shoring up political authoritarianism,
as one might opine has happened in recent years in Egypt.
While important specific areas of tension exist between how the rule of law
is conceptualized in the United States and Arab societies, the rule of law is
generally appreciated as useful and in need of amelioration within the Middle
East. The impediment for American rule of law advisors does not, therefore, lie
in a lack of Arab desire for more predictable, responsive, and fair laws. Instead,
the problem is a widespread two-fold Arab concern about the United States as
the messenger for the rule of law in the Middle East. First is a common sense
that U.S. policymakers do not know or care to know basic aspects of law,
politics, and society in Arab countries. Second is an even stronger perception
that the United States does not, in fact, practice what it preaches in fealty to the
rule of law through its government's policies, particularly those in the Middle
East.
As a result, well-intentioned American efforts to export ideas about the rule
of law to Arabs are unlikely to succeed unless and until the U.S. is seen as less
hypocritical in its own embrace of the rule of law at home and abroad. Even
should this happen, I argue below, the rule of law as an export industry seems
inherently problematic because it cannot be decoupled from the broader
challenge of bolstering political accountability and limits on governments in
Arab countries.
With this basic point in mind, after discussing in brief what is meant by the
rule of law, I turn to ways in which the understanding and the politics of the rule
of law are, as a general matter, similar and different in American and Arab
societies.
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN ARAB AND AMERICAN CONTEXTS
Before discussing the rule of law in the Middle East, it is important to be
clearer about the meaning of the concept itself. The brevity of this talk and the
complex ways in which the concept is used defy a complete answer to this
definitional issue. Nonetheless, the rule of law generally refers to the pre-
eminence of legal norms over personal political authority, or, as often form-
ulated, a government of laws, not men.
Although the concept is used in diverse and imprecise ways,2 it typically
is grounded in an assumption of some separation between a society's politics
and law.3 Specifically, the rule of law is meant to protect people from anarchy,
2. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); FRANK UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Papers No. 30, 2002).
3. Gerhard Robbers, The Rule of law and its Ethical Foundations, in THE RULE OF LAW (Josef
Thesing ed., 1997).
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unpredictability, and arbitrariness. In broad terms, the rule of law suggests a
promise that legal supremacy, stability, and accountability will prevail over
leaders' caprices.
However, the extent to which politics can or even should be entirely sepa-
rated from law is unclear; it varies within and across societies. At the same
time, the rule of law does not mean or guarantee that ordinary citizens enjoy the
same access to legal resources as leaders. Despite the ideal of laws trumping
leaders, the reality is that the drafters, executors, or interpreters of law can flout
this ideal unless meaningful accountability and transparency exist in a political
system.
Indeed, one vein of recent social scientific scholarship on the rule of law
insists that it is, to some extent, an unrealizable ideal that is inseparable from
specific politics.' Perhaps because of the real questions of whether and how law
can truly curb abuses by the leaders of powerful countries, ideas about imple-
menting the rule of law often focus on the relatively limited dimension of
improving procedural regularity in courts or lawyers' guilds. More fruitful
approaches might look instead at detailed assessments of how political and legal
systems do and do not approximate rule of law ideals in such areas as legal
restraints on government, legal system neutrality, and human rights.
In the late 1990s, members of the U.S. foreign policy community con-
cerned with the democratization of non-Western political systems increasingly
asserted that globalization of economic free markets and representative political
institutions could only take root in societies with shared respect for the rule of
law. However, there is little empirical research as to how such shared respect
is established or how the rule of law is conceptualized and contested in specific
non-Western contexts. The research that does exist tends to be focused
narrowly on judicial opinions and the function of courts, rather than whether or
how popular the understanding of or respect for law may matter to legal and
political systems more generally.
The rule of law industry has grown, despite this dearth of research as to
how the rule of law is established and legitimized in a society. In Arab societies
where Washington is prone to underestimate the importance and variations of
popular political attitudes, limiting treatment of the rule of law to the perfor-
mance of elite judicial institutions would seem to compound a major error of
U.S. foreign policy. Some specification of the nature and contested political
meanings of the rule of law that moves beyond judges and courtrooms is
therefore important. My discussion today is limited to the putative connection
between legalism and democratic development. I believe that the contemporary
Arab context suggests that the rule of law cannot and should not be readily
decoupled from its general political situation. Thus, aiming to improve the rule
4. DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 15 (Josd Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, eds. 2003).
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of law without confronting a broader authoritarian backdrop can do little to
foster democratization or better law, for that matter.
This is not to imply either that the rule of law is absent from Arab societies
or that these societies are inherently or unalterably undemocratic. On the
contrary, a major point below is that the rule of law, as an ideal, is similar in
Arab and American societies. However, this ideal should be understood with
reference to the reality of its past and present use by external and internal
autocrats to serve political centralization. For this reason, I argue below that the
best hope for American-based rule of law work in Arab contexts is in areas that
have the potential to decrease the gap between ideal and reality in the
subordination of government elites to laws.
A. Points in Common
As is true in the United States, the rule of law has been an influential
doctrine in Arab political history. Indeed, the Islamic and Ottoman socio-legal
traditions that contribute to contemporary Arab law predate the Anglo-American
common law by many centuries. Moreover, the Middle Eastern origin should
not be forgotten of two of the most ancient legal codes of all: the Code of
Hammurabi and the Judeo-Christian Bible. Thus, no serious discussion about
the potential for American rule of law specialists to bolster the rule of law in
Arab states can proceed without acknowledgment that the concept has firm roots
in Middle Eastern soil.
I focus on points in common between Islamic and American law. This is
sensible in light of the fact that Islam dominated the development and practice
of law from the seventh century until the present. Moreover, the dominant
contemporary trope of political discourse and opposition in Arab countries at
present remains Islamic, so the idea that Islamic law may have some significant
resemblance to law in the United States has implications for contemporary rule
of law work. Nonetheless, a comprehensive discussion of how the legal land-
scape in Arab societies might be recognizable to American law specialists
would require consideration of more dimensions of Arab law than can be
discussed in this modest presentation.
Among the sociopolitical effects of Islam from its seventh-century incep-
tion is three of obvious relevance to the rule of law. The first is the general
understanding of Muslims that Islamic political theory specifically stressed
political accountability by insisting that rulers' legitimacy was grounded in their
status as defenders of the Islamic faith and its principles, whether this status is
based on descent from the prophet Muhammed's bloodline or some other
distinction. In particular, rulers were to be judged by qualified Islamic scholars
and Muslims more generally on their record of executing and enforcing Islamic
law.
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To be sure, leaders historically used their military power more frequently
to subjugate than to empower Muslim jurists in the exercise of their mandate to
determine when Islamic law was being upheld. Nonetheless, the connection of
political legitimacy and legalism cannot be ignored as a core concept in Islamic
history. In short, if the very purpose of an Islamic political order is to execute
law, the rule of law is, in theory, integral to Muslim society.
A second point is the manner in which concerns about justice have been
centrally and popularly embedded in Islam. Justice as a concept and a discourse
is ubiquitous in the Qur'an. Moreover, Islam's emphasis on justice includes
significant emphases on social equity and individual rights. Thus, discussions
of many of the general and specific issues that frame legal discourse are
engrained in the religious identity of the large majority of people in Arab
societies.
The importance of justice within Islam also contributed to the fact that
Islamic jurisprudence never fully developed a concept of natural law. This has
meant that there is no clear theory to ground legitimate, a completely secular
legal order, as natural law helped do over time in the West.
A third, if more contentious point, is that Islamic political theory can be
read as presupposing two central tenets that have clear relevance to contem-
porary discussions of the rule of law: despite the ideal that political authority
exists for the benefit of Islam, authority in practice will tend towards absolu-
tism, rather than subordinating itself to communal legitimacy or justice; and
resources autonomous from the state (civil society) are therefore needed to
check leaders' actions. In essence, a significant tendency of classical Islamic
legal theory is a distrust of government and an emphasis on finding legal ways
to constrain authority that would sound quite familiar to many Americans.
One major scholar of the Middle East argues that Islamic law shares a
fourth and crucial feature of Anglo-American law-a common law system.
Anthropologist Lawrence Rosen makes a good case for considering as funda-
mentally similar American and Islamic laws' reliance on local courts and local
cultural information as characteristics that distinguish both from the legal
centralization of a civil law system.5 Thus, American and Arab lawyers may
share a similar understanding of the importance of locally-grounded legal
process, among other things.
Nonetheless, experts such as Rosen emphasize that similarities between
legal systems exist alongside significant differences. For instance, American
and Islamic common law vary in crucial ways, such as American law's doctrine
of litigating a particular legal issue once to establish a future precedent, as
opposed to Islamic law's predilection towards assuming that no two sets of
5. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW AND
SOCIETY 48 (2000).
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litigants are alike even when issues are similar. Thus, an appreciation that legal
systems in the United States and the Middle East may share important features
should not carry with it an assumption that differences can or should be mini-
mized. I turn now to some of the most basic and important of these differences.
B. Points in Contention
The rule of law exists as a political touchstone in Arab societies, just as it
does in the United States. Yet particular differences in the sociopolitical
environment of the Middle East and North America shape local understandings
and implementation of the rule of law in significant ways. Prime among these
is an important, if sometimes over-stated, source of many contemporary Arabs'
concerns about Western countries' politics, the multifaceted impact of Ottoman
and European colonial domination.
The impact of foreign great power rule on the rule of law in the Middle
East and North Africa was threefold. First, it led to a patchwork of legal orders
in a given society, rather than the relatively long-standing growth of a unitary
national legal system such as occurred in the United States. Second, it set up an
authoritarian norm that law would in fact be subordinated to imperial political
power. Third, and related to this, it fostered a tendency for constitutions to exist
without a significant history of judicial interpretation. In some states, such as
Morocco, this led to frequent redrafts of the constitution to reflect changes in the
power or preoccupations of political authority, in contrast with the American
norm of a single basic constitutional document that can only be modified with
difficulty.
The legal system of every contemporary Arab nation is a unique mixture
of Islamic, Ottoman, European, and post-independent laws.6 To be sure, a
number of territories escaped direct foreign domination, most notably in the
Persian Gulf. The mixture of sources of law in most Arab societies does not in
itself preclude legal clarity or the development of legal checks on authority.
However, along with the lapses in territorial and ethnic logic that European
colonial powers frequently employed in setting borders for many of the contem-
porary nations of the Middle East, the lack of legal systemic unity in Arab states
has two logical consequences for recent American-fostered efforts to enhance
the rule of law: the jurisprudential reference points of lawyers in the United
States are not likely to be of direct use to Arab societies; and post-colonial Arab
leaders have had many incentives to centralize their authority and no real legal
impediments.
6. For a succinct summary of the combination of sources of law in each Arab area, see NATHAN
J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 3-5 (1997).
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This second source of general Arab sociopolitical divergence is even more
obviously related to the primary legacy of colonialism in the Middle East - an
emphasis on control backed by force that was not meant primarily to serve the
best interests of indigenous citizens. The political example that socialized Arab
nationalist elites was the resort by colonial regimes to fictitious and fallacious
political forms like mandates and protectorates to conceal their exercise of raw
military power. Legal norms and institutions existed under colonialism in
which the contradictions between stated and true purposes were readily
apparent.
At the same time, these norms and institutions were somewhat successful
at centralizing political and economic administration. While Arab nationalists
rebelled against colonial rule, they also learned that the lofty promises of
colonial political ideas were generally subservient, or even in direct contrast to
the reality of police control. Small wonder that facing severe economic and
other challenges, these nationalists built on, instead of dismantling, the legacies
of authoritarian rule that they inherited.
To be sure, the ideal of the rule of law will often be at odds with the
centralizing tendencies of governments. My argument is that Arab states in the
Middle East, in general, had an especially wide gap between ideal and reality
because of the combination of the relative lack of autonomous pre-colonial,
unified, legal order in these states, and the repressive tendencies of colonial
governments. More subtly, I am suggesting that the level of discontinuity
between the rational, legalistic values preached by European administrators and
their practice of resource extraction and police rule tainted the very ideal of the
rule of law in a way that is unlikely to resonate with the socialization of many
American lawyers.
In short, many Arabs view the rule of law in a manner similar to American
legal scholars on the left, as an ideology of political control, not as a check on
political abuse. Of course, this does not mean that post-independent Arab
regimes lacked a legal system or avoided legal centralization and growth.
Indeed, most Arab states have basic laws or constitutions. Thus, a third major
distinction between Arab and American political experiences with the rule of
law is not that Arab constitutions do not matter, but that they have been subject
to less institutionalization and independent judicial interpretation than has the
U.S. Constitution.
This difference is neither surprising nor unknown to American rule of law
experts. In fact, given Arab political centralization, the very existence of con-
stitutions is at least as interesting a political phenomenon as the dearth of
independent judicial interpretative traditions for these documents.7 For my
7. For a very good treatment of the importance of Arab constitutions, see NATHAN J. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2002).
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purposes here, however, it is worth underscoring the challenge that the juxta-
position of constitutions and political regimes with few genuine legal checks
poses for building broad social support or even judicial competence for the rule
of law.
A fourth difference of approach to the rule of law between U.S. and Arab
societies does not connect directly to the Middle East's history of outside great
power influence, but it is the relationship of law and religion. Within the United
States, religious pluralism has led to the ideal that law should facilitate the
separation of church and state. However, with the notable exceptions of
Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, Arab societies have predominantly Muslim popula-
tions, and have built political orders that often establish Islam as a state religion.
Thus, laws and legal institutions in many Arab states, even those with
secularized leaders, privilege Islam and its traditions.
Of course, most scholars of American Constitutional law would assert that
the separation of church and state in the United States is far from perfect or
unproblematic, and has often favored Christianity and its ideas. Nonetheless,
the assumption that Islam should inform the political and social order has
caused, and is likely to continue to cause, misunderstandings and difficulties for
would-be American political reformers in the region.
The extent to which Islam in general, and the shari 'a in particular, should
inform the rule of law and what forms this should take is a complicated, current
area of great debate and discussion among Arab and non-Arab Muslim scholars.
Adding to the complexity of this issue is the theoretical contradiction between
the Islamic ideal of siyyasa al-shari'a, or the rule of God's law, and siyadat al-
qanun, or the rule of man-made law. The latter term, the general way in which
the Western idea of the rule of law is translated into Arabic, conveys with it a
patina of illegitimacy to many Muslims.
However, there is no obvious reason that the ideal political effects of the
rule of law, constraining governmental abuse and providing procedural fairness,
are impossible to achieve in a society with an established religion, so long as
religious dissenters and minorities receive legal protection. Yet understanding,
navigating, and being sensitive to the ways that religion and politics are
intertwined in most Arab societies is a daunting task for American rule of law
experts and one that their own socialization and training in the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution is unlikely to facilitate.
It is important to reiterate that the above four major differences between
Arab and American experiences with the rule of law do not eliminate the
possibility that Arab governments can have more robust legal checks or that
many Arabs are predisposed towards the rule of law. My argument is instead
that the experiential differences discussed above pose intellectual barriers for
American law specialists who seek to strengthen the rule of law in the Middle
East. Moreover, these differences raise some Arabs' suspicions that American
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lawyers are functioning in the manner of previous agents of Western foreign
powers, whose attractive political words concealed their complicity in imperial
coercion.
In short, would-be American rule of law experts face a variety of specific
and general challenges in trying to bring legal reform to Arab societies:
1) The diverse sources and systems of law;
2) The authoritarian legacy of colonialism;
3) The lack of authority and tradition of judicial review; and
4) The connection between the mosque and state.
These are all features of the Middle Eastern legal landscape that hobble
easy access for lawyers whose primary grounding is in American common law
and politics. Furthermore, a general wariness towards Western incursion,
alongside a particular negative reaction to American foreign policy since 9/11,
creates a particularly unreceptive current environment for rule of law reformers
with even the best of techniques and intentions. What then, is to be done?
III. REFORMING THE RULE OF LAW REFORMERS?
One simple response to the formidable challenges to U.S.-based rule of law
work in Arab countries is to give up on it. Indeed, there is something to be said
for this. American foreign policy hubris and na'vet6 in general often have
exacerbated the ability of the U.S. to influence political change in the region.
Humility and introspection in the face of a genuine crisis in American-Arab
foreign relations may prove to be the best strategy in the long run to foster legal
reform. After all, Arabs themselves are best-suited to understand and work in
the diverse and different sociopolitical environments discussed above. Given
the pessimism in Washington for Arab political transformation as a result of the
challenge of Iraq, the winding down of U.S. rule of law work in the Middle East
may in fact be the most likely scenario.
However, I do not believe that abandoning the possibility of a useful role
for Americans in Arab legal reform is the only conclusion that follows from my
analysis. Facilitating changes in Arab societies that increase the legal system's
prospects for moderating governmental excess continues to be one possible way
of improving Arabs' lives. The key to rule of law work in the Middle East is the
realization that it cannot get very far if it is decoupled from broader strategies,
which address the repressive tendencies of authoritarian regimes in the region,
along with the popular perceptions of many Arabs that the U.S. government is
complicit in this repression.
Arab governments consistently rank among the worst cases in the world in
their refusal to uphold their citizens' political freedoms, human rights, and civil
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liberties. Explanations abound for the resilience of Arab authoritarianism.8 Yet,
a core part of this issue is Washington's understandable, if short-sighted,
general preference for governments in the Middle East that it might characterize
as stable, whether or not such stability comes at the point of a gun. The second-
largest recipient of American foreign aid in almost every year since the late
1970's, Egypt, has used its funds to buy weapons and police to enforce the
government of the very unpopular and anti-democratic military leader Hosni
Mubarak. Long-term studies of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are clear
that Washington's predilection for maintaining extant regimes usually
outweighs its commitment to popular accountability and democratization.
The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has intensified this trend. The unpopular
governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have delibe-
rately emphasized the message to American policymakers that their repressive
politics are necessary to combat Islamic extremism. Whether or not Washing-
ton insiders are persuaded by this message, the need to line up Arab support to
help with the war and reconstruction in Iraq has made it an especially unlikely
time for the United States to press its allies in the region. For all the Bush
Administration's rhetoric about democracy and change in the Middle East,
regional human rights and democratic reform outside of Afghanistan and Iraq
have received little sustained attention.
In other words, democratic activists in Arab societies are right to express
frustration with the U.S. government's actions, for they correctly perceive a
discontinuity between American democratic ideals and American governments'
general practice of supporting repressive rulers. Ironically, one of the ways that
authoritarian governments in the Middle East, including those closely linked to
Washington, have tried to deflect their citizens' dissatisfaction has been to fan
the flames of anti-Israel feeling, which, in turn, fuels Arab anger towards the
Jewish state's major ally. It may not seem reasonable to Americans that many
Arabs harbor such hostility for Washington's stalwart support of Israel.
Nonetheless, this issue is undoubtedly one of the things that poison potential
dialogue between Arabs and Americans.
Short of an unlikely major foreign policy overhaul, what can American
policy-makers and rule of law specialists do to help Arab legal systems function
more credibly? The obvious first step is for rule of law reform efforts to take
into account the greater cultural and political similarities with respect to the rule
of law between Arabs and Westerners, while also making efforts to understand
and tailor programs geared towards the specific differences discussed above.
This is undoubtedly an easy suggestion for well-intended rule of law activists
8. See, e.g., 36/2 COMPARATIVE POLITICS (Jan. 2004) (a special issue devoted entirely to explaining
Arab authoritarianism); DANIEL BRUMBERG, LIBERALIZATION VERSUS DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING ARAB
POLITICAL REFORM (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 37, 2003).
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to embrace, and one which people engaged in rule of law work undoubtedly
strive to achieve. Nonetheless, it will require much more research and on-the-
ground knowledge to realize.
A second, more challenging step that would-be rule of law reformers
should take, is to appreciate the importance of viewing rule of law work as
inextricably connected to the broader context of authoritarian politics in most
Arab states. Specifically, specialists must craft their programs and arguments
to project a clear understanding that entrenched authoritarian institutions, often
supported by the United States rather than anti-democratic cultural norms, are
the major impediment to expanding the role that legal norms and institutions can
play in expanding political freedom and participation. Indeed, some apprecia-
tion that even societies like the United States that view themselves as shining
examples of the rule of law can show tarnish in some of their practices. Doing
these things, in turn, can contribute to the credibility problem of American
advisors preaching legalism at the same time that the American government is
perceived to stand for supporting repressive regimes and projecting force in a
neo-imperialistic manner.
Rule of law activists need not despair of the impossibility of achieving
these two general policy prescriptions. There are specific strategies that they
can follow that have yielded positive results both in terms of increasing the
pressures of law on centralized politics in Arab states and boosting the
credibility of American reformers. Let me mention four such strategies:
1) Link up with Arab activists and initiatives;
2) Localize the scope of reform to particular issues or sectors that
increase legal pressures for political accountability;
3) Look for openings that move reform work beyond a narrow elite of
judges and politicians;
4) Let issues like education, Internet access and freedom of the press get
onto the reform agenda that may be prerequisites, rather than obvious
components of respect for the rule of law.
This is, of course, where human rights reform in Arab societies is very
instructive. As I have argued at length elsewhere,9 a variety of politicized
groups in several Arab countries in the 1980s and early 1990s found human
rights activism particularly useful, because it manifested the potential to chip
away at state authoritarianism. More specifically, international human rights
activism in two countries I know well, Morocco, and Tunisia, was able to make
use of all four of the above strategies and link up particularly well with local
9. See David M. Mednicoff, Think Locally, Act Globally? Cultural Framing and Human Rights
Movements in Tunisia and Morocco, 7 INT'L J. HUMAN RIGHTS 72-102 (2003).
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initiatives to the extent that it seemed to connect with pressuring governments
to liberalize politically. In Morocco, the ongoing synergy between rights
activism and gradual political opening has meant a continuation and diversifica-
tion of human rights politics, such as the recent effort that bridged international
and indigenous feminists to reform the country's mudawana, or family code in
early 2004.
The release of prominent Egyptian sociologist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, from
an Egyptian prison in 2003 for his criticism of Hosni Mubarak's government is
also notable for its involvement of a coalition of Arab and Western lawyers,
intellectuals, and other activists. This coalition managed to get the Bush
Administration to put high-level pressure on the Egyptian government, which
in turn, publicized the extent to which Mubarak's trial and sentencing flouted
the ideals of the rule of law. Even though Ibrahim's release appears to be a
more modest accomplishment than might the training of an entire cadre of
judges in Anglo-American jurisprudence, it serves the growth of the rule of law
precisely because it highlights the general manner in which a well-developed
Arab legal system can nonetheless be subordinated to authoritarian politics.
The above suggested strategic orientations all build on four major points that
follow from my comments:
1) The rule of law as an ideal is relevant to and understandable within
Arab societies;
2) The legacy and endurance of authoritarianism in Arab countries
engenders understandable cynicism about governments' and out-
siders' use of the term;
3) Rule of law work cannot therefore be decoupled from addressing the
resilience of political elites who see law as serving, rather than con-
straining them;
4) The particular differences between the Arab and American contexts
for the rule of law and the particular distrust which many Arabs have
for the U.S. government require circumspection, caution, and coali-
tion with Arab activists if rule of law work is to have even a modest
hope of success.
My sketch here of the broad problems and prospects for rule of law work in
contemporary Arab societies and the conclusions that follow, should not be read
as an attack on American specialists who believe in the importance of
strengthening the promise of equality, rights, and political accountability for the
betterment of Arabs in general. I am instead proceeding from a posture which
is likely to be shared by the most experienced and proficient of these activists
-that a scaling-down of expectations and a scaling-up of patience represent the
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best prospect for any hope of improvement in the sustained subjugation of law
by Arab leaders.
Echoing Alexis deTocqueville's well-known sense that lawyers are less
inclined than many others to political rashness, I would like to think that
American practitioners of rule of law projects in Arab societies would push for
this policy area to be characterized by diligence, deliberation, and diplomacy,
rather than a legal missionary posture that has little to do with current regional
realities. In any case, as much as we lawyers might like to think otherwise, the
social scientist side of my academic background suggests to me that working to
dismantle authoritarian governments in Arab countries is more likely to foster
the rule of law than the other way around.
